We introduce this special issue on Benjamin Gregg's recent theory of a human rights state by contextualising it within current human rights scholarship and explicating its core claims, before we provide an overview of the eight contributions. We argue that the concept of a human rights state addresses two interrelated problems within human rights research by bridging the significant disconnect in the literature between human rights theory and practice. First, it conceives human rights as socially constructed norms whose reach and validity are historically contingent, depending on their free embrace and effective implementation by their local addressees. In this way it dispenses with the ever fruitless, even counterproductive attempts to advance human rights by claims about their putative, ultimate normative foundation. Second, it overcomes the limitations and failures of the topdown, generally unenforceable international human rights regime with a bottom-up alternative: the human rights state as a metaphorical polity in which activists promote human rights-friendly change within the corresponding nation state. In each case of such a metaphorical polity, a network of selfselected activists within the nation state promotes the free embrace of self-authored human rights through incorporating those rights in the nation state's legal and political system. Subsequently, aspirations to an international human rights law would finally be redeemed as effective norms through the overlapping agreement among more and more political communities that have freely embraced their self-authored human rights and institutionalised them at local levels.
Introduction

2
Social scientific research advances through the development and discussion of new theories, new concepts, new arguments. This special issue seeks to advance the interdisciplinary field of human rights research through a critical, multi-perspectival discussion of a new concept: the 'human rights state'. As the normative ideal of a cosmopolitan, human rights-based alternative to the contemporary nation state, the social and political theorist Benjamin Gregg first articulated the notion of the human rights state in his widely discussed book Human Rights as Social Construction. 1 In his recent publication The Human Rights State: Justice Within and Beyond Sovereign Nations, 2 Gregg revised the concept into a comprehensive proposal for a very particular kind of social movement that pursues human rights change through the politics of metaphor.
This special issue is the first collection of articles that scrutinise the idea of a human rights state and critically explore its potential for advancing both the theory and practice of human rights.
The idea to collect and publish these critical replies first developed in an international seminar hosted by the Glasgow Human Rights Network (GHRN) in May 2015, in which a diverse group of researchers and practitioners discussed the not-yet-published manuscript of The Human Rights State among themselves and with the author. Most of the contributions in this special issue flow from that conversation at the University of Glasgow, a conversation since then continued in different forms across many different countries. Before introducing the themes and arguments of the articles collected here, we first prepare the ground for this sprawling debate. We contextualise Gregg's theory of the human rights state in the wider field of human rights research and explicate its key features.
The human rights state in the context of human rights scholarship
The concept of the human rights state directly responds to both a theoretical and a practical problem.
First, it replies to the insular and often exclusionary tendencies in philosophical attempts to explain and justify human rights. Second, it addresses the limits of the contemporary international human rights regime to achieve effective and sustainable human rights change within nation states around the world. The theory of the human rights state offers a conceptual solution to both problems by bridging the significant disconnect between them.
Breaking through the metaphysical limbo of legitimation: human rights as social constructions
In the history of the human rights movement, the intellectual force of the human rights idea has always depended on the belief that 'rights exist as moral demands that need to be translated into legal and institutional contexts'. 3 This idea continues to be compelling particularly in contexts where people 3 cannot rely on legal or political institutions. 17 Rather than enhancing people's moral imagination, instead of providing an inclusive vocabulary of social justice, these arguments in their never resolved competition with each other end up contributing to the isolation of philosophical discourse from the practical tasks of human rights advocacy.
The theory of the human rights state, by contrast, construes human rights as socially constructed, hence as a political project still to be undertaken. The theory offers a vision of a new strategy for human rights activism. At the centre of this strategy is the human rights state itself, 'a metaphorical polity constituted by interested, self-selected members of a corresponding nation state'. 18 The members of this polity author their own human rights, which they recognise and observe among themselves while they pursue the incorporation of these human rights within the domestic constitution of the corresponding nation state. The members advance the free embrace of these selfauthored rights beginning with their local communities and then spreading outward, overlapping with other locally instantiated communities of human rights advocates, with the ultimate goal of persuading the political and legal systems of the corresponding nation state to institutionalise human rights effectively in the sense of state-recognised, state-enforced legal norms reinforced by the nation state's political culture. 19 
The human rights state as both complement and alternative to international human rights law
Apart from providing an alternative conceptual and normative foundation of human rights grounded in the social practice of norm construction, the theory of the human rights state proposes a unique form of activism towards human rights-friendly change within nation states, indeed on a local level with the self-motivated participation of ordinary people. It envisions a network of self-selected activists promoting the free embrace of self-authored human rights by political communities and, eventually, the realisation of these rights through juridification: their incorporation into the nation state's legal and political system. In this way it responds to the inherent limits and practical failures of the international human rights regime--problems confirmed by recent studies across the field.
5
While many scholars have long assumed that the international codification of human rights would automatically yield positive effects around the world, 20 recent scholarship casts doubt on the efficacy of international human rights law and its various organisations. Scholars have documented an ever-widening gap between the willingness of state governments to ratify human rights treaties, on the one hand, and little if any commitment to implement these rights effectively, on the other. 21 They have bemoaned the inherent ineffectiveness of international human rights law, 22 and they have monitored and criticised the tendency of Western states to justify imperialist foreign policies with the need to protect international human rights standards. 23 The notion of human rights as local social constructs 24 human hand yet discoverable by special persons or particular worldviews.
To locate human rights as authored by the very persons to whom they apply--and to construe the meanings of human rights, their concrete applications and possible validity in intersubjectively shared understandings of particular political communities--is not to reject the potential of the idea of international human rights law. Rather, it is to understand that potential as yet to be realised. It is to understand that potential as one day realisable because nation states will have incorporated human rights freely into their own domestic legal systems and political cultures, rendering international law more or less reflective of domestic conviction and for that reason, among others, finding some degree of domestic enforcement. It is to understand international human rights law as a norm developed bottom up, from domestic populations faithfully represented by domestic elites, rather than as a norm imposed, top down, by foreign powers and hostile forces.
In short, the notion of a human rights state bridges theory and practice by overcoming two bottlenecks that have bedevilled the human rights project. First, it dispenses with a decades-long 6 search for ultimate foundations, a search that cannot succeed and that wastes efforts better spent on advancing what hardly requires otherworldly validation anyway. 25 Unlike idle theoretical efforts unable to recognise the moral adequacy of humankind's capacity to give itself norms for the just treatment of others, this notion encourages human rights activism, beginning with norm construction by the actual addressees of any plausible human right. Second, the device of a human rights state can do work that international law cannot: it can generate a local commitment to human rights on the part of ordinary people. It can contribute, then, to the likelihood that human rights norms will be observed locally (and the local venue is always the primary venue for human rights practice). And it may be able to steer the nation state in human rights-supportive directions because it comes from within the nation state, as a product of citizens, rather than something advocated and imposed by distant, foreign elites.
The special issue
In their diversity in perspective and argumentation, the articles comprising this special issue reflect the multidisciplinarity of human rights research as well as the fact that Gregg's theory of the human rights state itself feeds on, and speaks to, different bodies of literature within this proliferating field.
We have here analytical paradigms and disciplinary lenses that range from sociology, political science and philosophy to education, law, history and religious studies. Some articles combine multiple perspectives.
These articles are also representative of a growing interest of scholars and practitioners in alternative theories, justifications and strategies to advance the human rights project. As scholars identify the multiple weaknesses and constraints of the current international human rights regime (some authors even perceive 'the endtimes of human rights' 26 ), academics and activists alike are searching for new ways to facilitate human rights beyond existing institutions and the usual mechanisms of human rights protection. In that spirit, the contributions to this special issue scrutinise the theory of a human rights state with an eye to its potential for informing empirical human rights research and advancing human rights practice. They do not simply adopt or apply the theory as it stands but engage it in critical dialogue, and some suggest ways to extend or revise it in light of specific national case studies or other practical experiences in the field.
Discernable within this diversity of approaches, however, are several overarching themes that run through the various authors' arguments. In one way or another, they focus on the liberal individualistic foundations of the human rights idea as well as of the human rights state; they examine the core concept of a human rights cognitive style; and they analyse the merits and drawbacks of Drawing on examples from their collaboration with the Belarusian State University, Bezbozhna and Olsson show how the concepts and strategies developed by Gregg might be translated and contextualised in university teaching. These concepts and strategies might then be deployed also in non-Western, nondemocratic countries, in this way to facilitate a free local embrace of human rights norms even beyond liberal democratic communities.
In the concluding 'Reply to My Critics', 36 Benjamin Gregg responds to the criticisms and suggestions put forward by the several contributions to this special issue, focusing on several overarching themes. One is normativity. In response to Wolfsteller, he urges sensitivity to the unavoidable interpretability in the deployment of any analytic tool that would measure degrees in the practical implementation of human rights: to interpret is to apply norms, yet value-neutral measurement in Wolfsteller's terms is not possible. In response to Li and McKernan , he rejects the notion that any normativity at all presupposes a specifically transcendental normativity (and shows how a this-worldly form of validity can be effective). Another theme concerns the nature of groups in the project to advance human rights. Gregg discusses Georgi's notion of group rights in a potential
Mexican human rights state and stresses the need for individual rights in the face of group oppression.
With respect to Terto Neto's conception of a Brazilian human rights state, he argues that the relevant scale of group rights is national not global. And he responds to Ognjenović and Jozelić's depiction of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian human rights state by stressing the danger inherent in a core goal of the human rights project: intersubjectively shared norms. Any norm is vulnerable to manipulation that violates its intended ends, and this holds all the more so for group norms. A third theme concerns the extent to which the human rights project should orient itself not on its aspiration to universal reach and validity but on the practical work that is relative to any given venue and context. In response to
Fahner, Gregg argues that the rule of law, but not democracy, is universally necessary for the local possibility of human rights. And he shows that the Raoul Wallenberg Institute's practical work in advancing human rights, as portrayed by Bezbozhna and Olsson, in fact operates with a notion of moral relativism even as it ultimately seeks moral universalism. At the end of his Reply, Gregg draws on each of the contributions to sketch possible directions for future research programmes on the idea and practice of a human rights state.
